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	FRANCE-LIBYA-CHAD: Conditions for Peace Tall	ks	
	Diplomatic maneuvering is increasing during a l	lull in the fighting in	25 <b>X</b> 1
	The official Libyan news agency reported yester chief Goukouni insists that all French and Zairian to have to be withdrawn before peace talks can be concerned to the US Embassy in N'Djamena, Habrangotiate until Libyan forces leave. Habre sent a medical chairman Mengistu on Saturday calling for a meet	roops and advisers onsidered. re says he will not nessage to OAU ting of the ad hoc	
	The Embassy also reports that Guy Penne, Pre African adviser, says that any political solution has Africans themselves rather than officials in Paris. Hodged Habre's request for air support. French premphasize, however, that the use of Jaguar fighter	sident Mitterrand's to involve the He reportedly ress reports	25X1
	been ruled out.	-bombers has not	25X1
	Press reports indicate that French and Libyan Brazzaville, Congo, yesterday.	officials met in	25X1 25X1
	Comment: Habre and Goukouni have been en split in the mid-1970s. They are likely to react caut negotiated settlement.		25X1
•	France's continued insistence that its troops in training purposes does not detract from their impo of the French commitment to aid Chad. Their pres positions clearly is intended to deter the Libyans fi	ortance as a symbol ence in forward	
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	UK-CHINA: Status of Negotiations on Hong Kong	·
	The British are expressing optimism about the negotiations with the Chinese over the future of Hong Kong, but contentious issues remain to be resolved.	25 <b>X</b> 1
	British officials say they are satisfied with the course of the talks, which have been recessed until next month. They believe they have persuaded the Chinese that, to maintain stability in Hong Kong, making progress on substantive issues is more important than haggling over the timing of discussions on the transfer of sovereignty.	25 <b>X</b> 1
•	The talks thus far have addressed general issues and have avoided specifics about the administration of Hong Kong after the transfer of sovereignty in 1997. London continues to want a British civil presence in Hong Kong after China assumes sovereignty, while the Chinese want Hong Kong to be a self-administered region.	25X1
	Comment: The British have often said that Beijing needs to be "educated" about political and economic realities in Hong Kong before a settlement can be reached. While they apparently believe that China still has many misconceptions about the colony, they have concluded Beijing now recognizes that transfer of control will be a complex and lengthy process.	25X1
	The UK's strategy for reducing public concern appears to be to blur the sovereignty "deadline" of 1997. London seems convinced that only a continued British presence will provide Hong Kong's	

residents a guarantee that the social and economic status quo will not change after Beijing assumes control.

London's optimism may be misplaced. Differences are certain to

emerge over basic questions of a residual British presence in Hong Kong's administration and over the length of any transition period.

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### **USSR: Andropov on the Economy**

General Secretary Andropov, in a speech to veteran party members yesterday, expressed his dissatisfaction with the pace at which the economy is improving and the lack of vigor in searching for ways to improve it. He stated that "changes in planning, management, and the economic mechanism" need to be introduced "in order to enter the new Five-Year Plan period . . . fully armed." Andropov sounded a cautionary note, however, by stressing the need to study proposals and innovations carefully and to determine how they affect economic performance.

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**Comment**: Andropov's use of this forum indicates that he still is searching for economic programs that can be carried out by the beginning of the Five-Year Plan for 1986-90. He has made clear that he would like to have a number of experiments introduced into the economy and evaluated before then. His note of caution evidently was intended to pacify reported opposition to economic changes. It also probably reflects the difficulties he has encountered in encouraging new economic programs.

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## **USSR: Romanov Responsible for Defense Industry**

sector's work is conducted without publicity.

Last week a Soviet official told the US Embassy that party secretary Romanov's low public profile since being transferred to Moscow in June is the result of his having been assigned responsibility for defense industry. In addition, a Soviet diplomat has claimed that Romanov's responsibilities include overseeing defense industry.

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Comment: Romanov's managerial skills demonstrated in heavy industry and defense industry in Leningrad would make him a suitable candidate for the defense industry portfolio.

Romanov's involvement in defense industry issues would help explain his failure to make frequent public appearances, as most of that

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#### **EL SALVADOR: Government Losses Decline**

The military suffered substantially fewer troop and equipment losses to the guerrillas last month than in previous months. According to Army sources, the guerrillas during July did not take any prisoners, killed or wounded only 82 soldiers, and captured only 80 weapons. Government losses for the previous three months averaged about 200 soldiers killed or wounded, 60 captured, and more than 165 rifles or other weapons lost. The insurgents claim to have inflicted about 20 percent more casualties and captured about twice as many prisoners during the same period.

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**Comment**: The decline in losses probably stems from the fact that the Army has generally held the tactical initiative since early June. This has prevented the insurgents from mounting the well-planned and coordinated attacks that marked their previous operations. The guerrillas' own losses, however, apparently have not been high.

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#### **PANAMA: Key Changes in the National Guard**

The transfer of command of the politically powerful National Guard to former Chief of Staff Noriega marks another step forward for retired Guard chief Paredes's presidential ambitions. During the ceremonies late last week, both Paredes and Noriega publicly pledged to continue the democratization process, which is scheduled to culminate in national elections next May. In other key changes in the Guard's General Staff, former Deputy Chief of Staff Diaz Herrera was elevated to chief of staff, and one of Noriega's proteges was named head of intelligence.

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**Comment:** The General Staff is likely to continue to give its support to Paredes because it believes that, as president, he would protect the military's position as the country's dominant political force. Although the opportunistic Noriega generally disdains permanent political alliances, he maintains close contacts with Havana and with Marxist elements in the region. Noriega's pragmatism, however, probably will dictate that he also continue close cooperation with US officials.

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USSR-AFGHANISTAN: Insurgent Attack on Ka	abul
Western observers in Kabul believe that the	fighting in the capital
on Saturday was the most intense in the last fee the US Embassy. Insurgent mortar fire hit vario	us targets throughout
the city, including the buildings housing Radio A	Afghanistan.
Comment: Increased insurgent attacks on I	Kabul are likely to
continue because recent Soviet and Afghan Go operations around the capital have failed to des	vernment military strov local guerrilla
strongholds. As a result, Soviet and governmen	t commanders
probably will launch new attacks against villages Such actions are unlikely to reduce insurgent ac	s surrounding the city. ctivity, but they
probably will cause more civilian casualties.	

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WESTERN EUROPE: Increasing Drug Problem		
The US Mission in West Berlin reports that heroin seizures and overdose deaths from heroin use have increased substantially there this year. These trends are attributed to trafficking by Sri Lankan refugees, who are selling uncut heroin obtained in Pakistan directly to consumers. The Mission also says that US military personnel thus far have not been involved, perhaps because the Sri Lankans are operating in private homes.		25 <b>X</b> ′
Comment: The situation in West Berlin is another example of the mounting drug abuse problem that is creating considerable alarm in Western Europe. In West Germany, where involvement of the large underemployed Turkish worker population in trafficking also is adding to serious social tensions, the government is using tougher measures to try to control the problem. In West Berlin, however, control efforts		
are hampered by limited cooperation on the part of East Germany—a popular transit route for smugglers from Southwest Asia.	:	25 <b>X</b> ′

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#### YUGOSLAVIA-USSR: Tank Deal Reported

A high-level Yugoslav defense official claims that Belgrade has signed a contract to produce the T-72 tank under Soviet license. A Yugoslav prototype is to be 25X1 completed by the end of this year, and prototype testing will continue through 1984, with production beginning in 1985. The contract permits Yugoslavia to sell T-72s to Third World countries on a caseby-case basis with Moscow's approval. After five years of production, however, Yugoslav-produced T-72s also have to be offered for sale to Warsaw Pact nations. 25X1 Comment: Yugoslavia has wanted to coproduce this tank for hard currency sales, but the USSR reportedly cooled to the negotiations last spring. Belgrade may have overcome Moscow's objections by promising to offer Yugoslav T-72s to the Warsaw Pact. The Soviets may be seeking to supplement lagging production levels of the problem-plagued T-72 programs in Poland and Czechoslovakia. Deadlines for T-72 production in those countries have not been met, and the Yugoslav production schedule also may be too optimistic. 25X1

#### **USSR-SEYCHELLES: Military Assistance**

between the US and the USSR.

The US Embassy in Victoria reports that the Soviets will supply Seychelles with two medium helicopters.

In May two Embassy sources said that some large crates were unloaded from a Soviet merchant ship and taken to the barracks of the North Korean soldiers who—with Tanzanians—serve as a security force in Seychelles. Late last month another known Soviet arms carrier called at Port Victoria with undetermined cargo.

Comment: The known deliveries represent a change in the type of the USSR's military assistance to Seychelles, which until now has mostly featured naval equipment—including patrol boats and coastal radars—and small arms. The Soviets are seeking to strengthen

relations with President Rene, who has tried to maintain a balance

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